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Responding to Genocide: Australian Parliamentary Discussions 
about the Crisis in Darfur 
Deborah Mayersen and Thomas Galloway 
 
Introduction 
‘Australia’s response [to the crisis in Darfur] has been slow, it has been hesitant, and, I 
regret to say, it has been inadequate’, remarked Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs Kevin 
Rudd in February 2005 (House of Representatives Hansard: 47).  Since 2003, genocide in 
Darfur has claimed more than 300,000 lives, with 2.6 million more displaced by the conflict 
(Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010: 294-300; Reeves 2012).  The international response to the 
crisis has been slow and lacklustre, and while the intensity of the conflict has fluctuated in 
the past nine years, the situation remains dire.  The Australian government’s policy 
response to the genocide has essentially mirrored the weak international response.  
Australia has made some diplomatic representations about the genocide, and provided 
humanitarian aid.  Overall, however, the genocide has not engaged the attention of many 
politicians, and nor has Australia’s policy response aligned with our strong commitment to 
genocide prevention generally. This paper will delve into the factors that shaped this policy 
response.  As the crisis has unfolded, it has been the subject of substantial discussion within 
the Australian parliament. This paper will explore the central themes within Australian 
parliamentary discussion of the genocide in Darfur, and examine how this discussion 
evolved over time.  It will also place the discussion within the wider context of Australia’s 
place and obligations within the international community, and the international response to 
the genocide in Darfur.  Finally, it will probe the factors that contributed to the relatively 
muted Australian response to this genocide.    
Background 
Darfur is a vast region in western Sudan, with a long history of neglect.  During the famine 
there in the mid-1980s, tensions grew between largely sedentary agriculturalist ‘African’ 
tribes and pastoralist, often nomadic ‘Arab’ tribes over competition for scant resources.  
Subsequent low-level violence was exacerbated by arms flowing from the unstable 
surrounding regions, and an Arab supremacist ideology of growing political influence (Flint 
and de Waal 2005: 49, 51; Daly 2007: 243).  Arab militias, known as Janjaweed, received 
government support, and civil war plagued the region.  African rebels formed self-defence 
units such as the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM), and began attacking government targets in late 2002.  In response to a 
major attack in 2003, the Sudanese government decided upon a campaign to promote 
exclusive Arab rights to Darfur, utilising genocidal tactics and ethnic cleansing to subdue the 
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region (Bloxham 2005: 69).  The Janjaweed were given arms, training and financial support 
by the Sudanese government, and perpetrated a brutal campaign of destruction (Prunier 
2005: 97-98; Collins 2006: 20).  By 2005, over 800 villages had been damaged or destroyed 
(Natsios 2006: 36).  Very quickly, refugee camps sprang up, and became overcrowded with 
survivors from Janjaweed attacks.  As the violence has waxed and waned since mid-2003, a 
further strategy of the government of Sudan has become ‘genocide by attrition’ – fostering 
huge mortality in the camps through preventing food and medical aid from reaching the 
refugees (Daly 2007: 286).  It is estimated at least 300,000 Darfuris have been killed in the 
conflict (Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010: 294-300; Reeves 2012). 
The international community responded slowly, inconsistently and reluctantly to the crisis in 
Darfur (de Waal 2007: 1043).  One of the reasons for this was the complicating situation of 
the north-south Sudan civil war (Tomar 2004: 6). There were fears that negotiations to end 
the long-running north-south conflict would be jeopardised by international pressure 
regarding Darfur, and it was decided that the two wars would be addressed ‘in sequence’ 
(de Waal 2007: 1041; Traub 2010: 7).  In reality, however, this enabled the Sudanese 
government to continue a ‘deadly and totally disproportionate’ campaign against the rebels 
in Darfur with impunity (International Development Committee 2005: 37).  By 2004 the vast 
destructiveness of the violence was readily apparent, but it took until July before the United 
Nations Security Council passed its first resolution on Darfur (UNSC Resolution 1556).  This 
was the first of several weak and ineffectual resolutions, despite pressure on the UN to take 
stronger action (Grzyb 2010: 11; Badescu and Bergholm 2009: 295-296).  Many 
governments and NGOs began publicly describing the situation as genocide, including the 
United States government (Grzyb 2010: 11).  When the UN Commission of Inquiry in Darfur 
refrained from concluding the violence there constituted genocide, it was widely 
discredited.  Nevertheless, it was not until after prolonged negotiations with Khartoum that 
in 2007 the UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was authorised.  Even then, the 
Mission’s lack of resources and an uncooperative Sudanese government substantially 
delayed deployment, and it has been of limited effectiveness (UN 2011).  Sudanese 
President Omar al-Bashir has been indicted for genocide by the International Criminal Court, 
and there is an arrest warrant pending against him.   
In responding to the genocide in Darfur, Australia essentially adopted a policy response that 
reflected the wider Western reticence to become involved. Australia provided humanitarian 
assistance, particularly for refugees and internally displaced persons. By 2011, this totalled 
approximately $71 million of aid (House of Representatives Hansard 2011: 6274). The 
government also made diplomatic representations to the UN Security Council.  Much of this 
diplomatic pressure was coordinated with New Zealand and Canada (Senate Estimates 2005: 
86).  However Australia declined a UN request to provide a ‘heavy support package’ for 
UNAMID, citing commitments elsewhere.  Direct representations to Sudan were limited, 
and a very soft approach was taken in addressing China’s ties with the Sudanese 
government.  In 2005, Labor Member Kevin Rudd commented in parliament: ‘Australia’s 
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response has been slow, it has been hesitant and, I regret to say, it has been inadequate’ 
(House of Representatives Hansard 2005: 47).   
Discussion in Parliament Concerning the Genocide in Darfur 
There has been substantial discussion regarding the crisis in Darfur in the Australian 
parliament since its escalation in 2003.  Before analysing these discussions, the first point of 
note is that members of parliament (MPs) demonstrated a high degree of awareness of the 
seriousness of the crisis in Darfur. Members of parliament, that is, understood that a 
genocide was occurring there. Liberal MP Bruce Baird, for example, directly compared the 
Darfur crisis with the 1994 Rwanda genocide, commenting: ‘After Rwanda the world 
promised that it would never again sit on its hands and watch a systemic genocide, yet the 
Sudan already closely resembles Rwanda’ (House of Representatives Hansard 2006: 45). 
Democrats Senator Natasha Stott Despoja also noted the international community’s 
‘apathy’ in ‘allowing another Rwanda to happen’ (Senate Hansard 2008: 465).  Michael 
Danby called the crisis ‘one of the most terrible situations that have taken place since the 
Second World War’ (House of Representatives Hansard 2007: 163). 
Many of the discussions in parliament centred around Australia’s policy response to the 
crisis. Hansard records of these discussions reveal a spectrum of opinions about how 
Australia should respond to the crisis.  At the most negative end of this spectrum was the 
perception that Australia could have little impact on the crisis.  Former Defence Minister 
Robert Hill made this belief explicit in a response to a question on Darfur from Senator Bob 
Brown in 2004.  Senator Hill stated that: ‘Obviously there is not a response that Australia 
can take as an individual party that is going to make a significant difference’ (Senate 
Hansard 2004: 24101).  Many members of parliament highlighted the value of Australia 
taking action in concert with other members of the international community, however.  In 
2009, for example, Labor Senator David Feeney noted that while it was ‘not possible for 
Australia to solve the crisis in Sudan on its own’, Australia had sufficient international 
influence to ‘keep the Darfur issue on the international agenda’ (Senate Hansard 2009: 
2943).   
There was strong support amongst members of parliament for Australia to take action on 
the crisis through the United Nations.  This is not surprising given the role of the UN, and 
particularly the Security Council, as the most important international actor dealing with the 
genocide.  Bruce Baird, for example, commented in 2006: ‘As the parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, it is our moral duty to pressure the UN ... to markedly increase 
foreign aid and to ready a large international peacekeeping force to quell the violence’ 
(House of Representatives Hansard 2006: 45). Indeed, many members of parliament 
referred to the key role of the United Nations.   
As the crisis progressed, however, members of parliament became increasingly critical of 
the UN response.  Labor Member Alan Griffin described the crisis in Darfur as an ‘appalling 
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indictment of international institutions’ (House of Representatives Hansard 2005: 47).  
Michael Danby similarly attributed the ‘slow and inadequate response’ to the situation in 
Darfur to international organisations, including the African Union (AU), the European Union 
(EU) and the UN (House of Representatives Hansard 2006: 50).  In 2006, Danby blamed the 
‘unholy alliance’ of China, Russia and France in the UN Security Council for ‘nearly always 
[standing] in the way of any effective action against regimes which grossly abuse human 
rights’, including in Darfur (House of Representatives Hansard 2006: 50).  Labor member 
Sharon Grierson similarly expressed her disappointment toward the Security Council for 
failing to declare that Darfur constituted a genocide (House of Representatives Hansard 
2005: 46).   
Knowledge of both the severity of the crisis and the ineffectual UN response produced calls 
in parliament for Australia to strengthen its response.  In 2005, Kevin Rudd commented 
‘Australia should be doing more ... Our government can do more and it should do more, and 
it will have the support of the Australian people if it accepts its responsibilities to do more’ 
(House of Representatives Hansard 2005: 47). In 2007 Michael Danby commented that ‘it is 
a shame that Australia is not taking stronger action along with other Western countries’, 
and that ‘We must take action to see that the murder of hundreds of thousands of people, 
the destruction of entire villages, and the raping and pillaging of the innocent people of 
Darfur ceases immediately’ (House of Representatives Hansard 2007: 163).   
Despite recognition of the paucity of the UN response to Darfur, many calls for stronger 
action within the Australian parliament still sought for this action to occur under the 
auspices of the United Nations.  In 2006, for example, Liberal member Petro Georgiou 
argued that ‘if the UN is to be a relevant and effective body, member states have to commit 
the resources that are essential for the UN to implement the Security Council resolution’ 
(House of Representatives Hansard 2006: 48).  In 2008 former Democrats leader Natasha 
Stott Despoja called for Australia to contribute desperately needed transport helicopters for 
UNAMID; she also called for the provision of peacekeepers (Senate Hansard 2008: 465-466).  
This was a call echoed by Liberal member Judi Moylan, who noted that ‘if we want to see 
peace restored in the region … we need to consider providing more peacekeeping support’ 
(House of Representatives Hansard 2008: 2022). 
There were relatively few calls for Australia to independently take stronger action in 
response to the Darfur crisis.  In 2005, after describing the Howard government’s response 
as ‘inadequate’, Kevin Rudd stated that ‘in the case of Sudan ... there was a humanitarian 
crisis which required urgent attention on the part of all governments’ (House of 
Representatives Hansard 2005: 47).  There were also some awkward questions over the 
extent to which Australian government representatives made strong and repeated 
representations directly to the Sudanese government. Yet most MPs seeking stronger action 
by the Australian government envisaged such action occurring through the United Nations.   
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The Australian parliament did not articulate a clear position as to what extent Australia’s 
own responsibility to respond to the genocide in Darfur operated independently of the 
collective obligation of the international community.  This is a particularly interesting finding 
given Australia’s specific international commitments to respond to genocide and mass 
atrocities.  Australia is a signatory of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and 
the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.  Contracting parties undertake to ‘prevent and to 
punish’ genocide, and may call on the United Nations to take action for the ‘prevention and 
suppression’ of acts of Genocide (Genocide Convention 1948). More recently, at the World 
Summit in 2005, Australia joined the international community in endorsing the 
‘responsibility to protect’ principle, a principle that highlights the national and international 
responsibility to protect populations from genocide and mass atrocities. The genocide in 
Darfur occurred during the same period in which this principle was endorsed, however it 
does not appear to have influenced Australia’s response. Indeed, in 2008 Liberal MP Scott 
Morrison commented in parliament on the incongruity between Australia’s endorsement of 
the responsibility to protect and the lacklustre response to the genocide in Darfur: ‘In Sudan 
we have had a critical test of the UN’s resolve on responsibility to protect.  In the face of a 
continuing and escalating humanitarian crisis, the international community, including 
Australia, is failing the test’ (House of Representatives Hansard 2008: 3190). This did not 
lead to stronger policy.  
In recent years, discussion in parliament on the genocide in Darfur has become more 
pessimistic.  There is recognition that the international community has failed to respond 
adequately to the genocide in Darfur, at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives. The 
genocide has also been increasingly discussed in the past tense. Liberal member Scott 
Morrison, for example, referred to Darfur as ‘another African tragedy’ (House of 
Representatives Hansard 2008: 2025).  Labor member Dr Andrew Leigh, speaking about UN 
Security Council reform, remarked ‘let us hope that reform of the UN Security Council can 
help us avert another Rwanda, Srebrenica, Kosovo or Darfur (House of Representatives 
Hansard 2011: 8419).  Kevin Rudd, speaking about the Security Council’s response to the 
atrocities in Libya, commented that had the world not acted to intervene militarily in that 
country, it ‘would have learnt nothing from the experience of Rwanda, Darfur and the 
Balkans’ (House of Representatives Hansard 2011: 2432).  Other members, such as Michael 
Danby and Kate Lundy, have recognised the protracted nature of the conflict, and the 
potential for Australia to continue to respond in some ways, including through the provision 
of humanitarian aid and acceptance of refugees from the Darfur region. 
Overall, there are two particular conclusions that emerge from reflecting on the 
parliamentary discussions regarding Darfur as a whole.  First, there was a relatively low level 
of engagement with the crisis amongst Australian politicians.  Only a small group of MPs 
have repeatedly discussed the issue in parliament during their terms.  Michael Danby’s 
passion for the issue is abundantly clear in the parliamentary record, and MPs such as 
Natasha Stott Despoja, Bruce Baird, Kevin Rudd, Sharon Grierson, and Scott Morrison have 
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also actively responded to the crisis.  Amongst those engaged with the issue, several have 
referred to Sudanese refugees in their electorates, something which has perhaps motivated 
their engagement.  Multiple factors appear to have limited political engagement with the 
genocide amongst politicians.  These include a lack of media coverage of the crisis in 
Australia, Australia’s orientation towards events in Asia rather than Africa, a lack of focus on 
the genocide amongst the wider public, and the reality of competing priorities and time 
pressures experienced by members of parliament (Interviews, 2012).  
The second conclusion that emerges from reflecting on the parliamentary discussions as a 
whole is the potential for more robust Australian policy responses to the genocide. Australia 
could have pursued the issue far more vigorously, and likely would have had there been 
more and louder calls to do so from the parliament (Interviews, 2012).  There were many 
opportunities for Australia to do so, whether through the provision of helicopters and 
peacekeepers for UNAMID, through stronger direct representations to the Sudanese 
government, or through representations to countries such as China to limit its trade with 
the genocidal regime.  It is disappointing that Australia did not utilise these opportunities 
more fully.   
Conclusion 
Parliamentary records provide a source of analysis and reflection about Australia’s response 
to the genocide in Darfur.  The discussions recorded in Hansard also document the broader 
process of the government response to genocide occurring in a foreign country.  In the case 
of Darfur, this process did not lead to particularly strong policy outcomes.  While there is 
much governmental and bipartisan support for the responsibility to protect principle and for 
the commitment to genocide prevention enshrined in the Genocide Convention, that 
support did not translate into a robust policy response to the genocide in Darfur.  The 
parliament lacked a clear position on the role of Australia in responding to genocide in a far-
removed region. It advocated responding through the United Nations, but this position did 
not evolve even as the UN’s failure to respond adequately became readily apparent.  
Opportunities for more direct and robust action were not fully utilised.  While all responses 
condemning genocide are laudable, and should rightly be praised, Australia’s response to 
the genocide in Darfur also offers an opportunity for reflection and consideration of how 
responses might be shaped in the future.  There are substantial opportunities for such 
responses to be strengthened.   
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